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Abstract
This article reconsiders the theory of existence of e cient allocations and
equilibria when consumption sets are unbounded below under the assump-
tion that agents have incomplete preferences. It is motivated by an ex-
ample in the theory of assets with short-selling where there is risk and
ambiguity. Agents have Bewley’s incomplete preferences. As an inertia
principle is assumed in markets, equilibria are individually rational. It
is shown that a necessary and su cient condition for the existence of an
individually rational e cient allocation or of an equilibrium is that the
relative interiors of the risk adjusted sets of probabilities intersect. The
more risk averse, the more ambiguity averse the agents, the more likely is
an equilibrium to exist. The paper then turns to incomplete preferences
represented by a family of concave utility functions. Several definitions of
e ciency and of equilibrium with inertia are considered. Su cient condi-
tions and necessary and su cient conditions are given for the existence of
e cient allocations and equilibria with inertia.
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1 Introduction
The issue of existence of an equilibrium for finite markets with short-selling is
an old problem first considered in the early seventies by Grandmont [8], Hart
[11] and Green [9] and reconsidered later by Hammond [10] and Page [13], [14].
In these early papers, investors were assumed to hold a single probabilistic belief
(homogeneous or heterogeneous) and be risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility maximizers. Two su cient conditions for the existence of an
equilibrium were given:
1. a condition which expresses that investors are su ciently similar in their
beliefs and risk aversions so that there exists a non empty set of prices
(the no-arbitrage prices) for which no agent can make costless unbounded
utility nondecreasing purchases,
2. a collective absence of arbitrage condition, which requires that investors
do not engage in mutually compatible, utility nondecreasing trades.
These conditions have been generalized to abstract economies and are known
as the existence of no-arbitrage prices condition (see Werner [17]) and the no
unbounded utility arbitrage condition (NUBA) ( see Page [14]). They were
shown to be equivalent under adequate hypotheses. Other su cient conditions
were given. For a review of the subject in finite dimension, see Allouch et al
[1], Dana et al [5], Page [13],[14]. All this trend of literature assumes complete
preferences.
This paper extends the previous theory to incomplete preferences repre-
sented by families of concave utility functions. Such incomplete preferences
include Bewley’s [2] and Rigotti and Shannon [15] incomplete preferences. Un-
der this representation assumption, it is easy to define and characterize the
concepts of no-arbitrage prices and no unbounded utility arbitrage. Weak and
strong concepts of e ciency and equilibria are defined. As in the case of com-
plete preferences, existence of a no-arbitrage price is shown to be equivalent to
NUBA and to be a su cient condition for the existence of weakly e cient allo-
cations and weak equilibria. Under further adequate assumptions (for example
strict concavity and monotonicity of utilities), it is shown to be necessary and
su cient for the existence of e cient allocations and equilibria.
As Page [14] and Werner [17], the paper is motivated by an example in the
theory of assets with short-selling. Agents are assumed not to have enough
information to quantify uncertainty by a single probability, hence each agent
has a set of priors. Agents are further assumed to have risk averse Bewley’s [2]
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(or Rigotti and Shannon [15] ) incomplete preferences. Under standard condi-
tions on utility indices (strict concavity and increasingness) and sets of priors
(convexity and compactness), it is shown that a necessary and su cient for the
existence of an individually rational e cient allocation or equilibrium is that
the relative interiors of the agents’ sets of risk adjusted probabilities intersect or
that agents do not engage in mutually compatible trades that have non negative
expectations with respect to their risk adjusted probabilities. The first condi-
tion generalizes the overlapping expectations given by Grandmont [8], Green
[9] and Hammond [10] for the case of single belief. The second generalizes the
NUBA type of condition given by Hart [11]. In a vNM framework, Hart [11]
further shows that the more risk averse the agents, the more likely is an equi-
librium to exist. In the Bewley’s setting, it is shown that the more risk averse,
the more ambiguity averse the agents, the more likely is an equilibrium to exist.
The example is also shown to have an interesting feature: the arbitrage
concepts coincide with those of a Gilboa-Schmeidler’s agent with same sets of
priors and utility indices. Hence the condition that the relative interiors of the
sets of risk adjusted probabilities intersect is also necessary and su cient for
the existence of an equilibrium in a model with Gilboa-Schmeidler’s preferences
(with same sets of priors and utility indices). This may seem at odds with the
literature on e ciency or equilibria with Bewley’s incomplete preferences (see
Bewley’s [2], Rigotti and Shannon [15] or Dana and Riedel [6]) which highlights
the di↵erences with using maxmin complete preferences. However it is not as a
di↵erent issue is addressed, that of existence of equilibrium with short selling.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 deals with the example and
provides an existence theorem while section 3 deals with its generalization.
2 An example
2.1 Bewley preferences
We consider a standard Arrow-Debreu model of complete contingent security
markets with short selling. There are two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, there is
uncertainty about which state s from a state space ⌦= {1, ..., k} will occur at
date 1. At date 0, agents who are uncertain about their future endowments
trade contingent claims for date 1. The space of contingent claims is the set
of random variables from⌦ ! R. The random variable X which equals x1
in state 1, x2 in state 2 and xk in state k, is identified with the vector in
X 2 Rk, X = (x1, . . . , xk). Let4 = {⇡ 2 Rk+ :
Pk
s=1 ⇡s = 1} be the probability
simplex in Rk. Let int4 = {⇡ 2 4, ⇡s > 0, 8 s}. For A ✓ 4, intA = {p 2 A |
3
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9 a ball B(p," ) s.t. B(p," ) \ int 4 ✓ A}. For a given ⇡ 2 4, we denote by
E⇡(X) :=
Pk
l=1 ⇡lxl the expectation of X. Finally, for a given price p 2 Rk,
p ·X :=Pkl=1 plxl, the price of X.
There are m agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. Agent i has an endowment
Ei 2 Rk of contingent claims. Let (Ei)mi=1 be the m-tuple of endowments and
E =
Pm
i=1E
i be the aggregate endowment. We assume that agent i has a
convex compact set of priors P i ✓int4 and an incomplete Bewley preference
relation ⌫ over Rk defined by
X ⌫i Y () E⇡(ui(X))   E⇡(ui(Y )), 8 ⇡ 2 P i (1)
where ui : R ! R is a strictly concave, increasing di↵erentiable utility index
fulfilling ui(0) = 0. The associated strict preference is X  i Y if X ⌫i Y and
E⇡(ui(X)) > E⇡(ui(Y )) for some ⇡ 2 P i.
2.2 Individual and collective absence of arbitrage
In this subsection, we define and characterize the useful vectors of a Bewley
preference relation of type (1). They are the directions such that trading at
any positive scale makes the agent better o↵. Our main result is that they
coincide with those of a Gilboa-Schmeidler utility defined by (u, P ) ( see (2)
below) .
We then recall the concepts of no-arbitrage prices and of collective absence of
arbitrage (NUBA). As these concepts only depend on useful vectors, we obtain
that two economies with Bewley preferences or Gilboa-Schmeidler utilities with
same indices and sets of priors have same sets of no-arbitrage prices and same
NUBA condition.
2.2.1 Useful vectors
To simplify notations, in this subsection, the agent’s index is omitted. We
consider an agent described by a pair (u, P ) of a utility index and a set of
priors. For ⇡ 2 P , let
bP⇡(X) = {Y 2 Rk | E⇡(u(Y ))   E⇡(u(X))}
be the set of contingent claims preferred to X for the utility E⇡(u(.)) and
R⇡(X) = {W 2 Rk | E⇡(u(X +  W ))   u(X), 8   2 IR+} be its asymptotic
cone. As E⇡(u(.)) is concave, R⇡(X) is independent of X and denoted R⇡.
Taking X = 0, we obtain:
R⇡ = {W 2 Rk | E⇡(u( W ))   u(0) = 0, 8   2 IR+}
Let bP (X) = {Y 2 Rk | E⇡(u(Y ))   E⇡(u(X)), 8 ⇡ 2 P}
4
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be the set of contingent claims preferred toX for the Bewley’s preference defined
by (1) and R(X) be its asymptotic cone. From Rockafellar’s [16] corollary 8.3.3,
R(X) = \⇡2PR⇡(X) = \⇡2PR⇡. Hence it is independent of X and denoted R.
R = {W 2 Rk | E⇡(u( W ))   0, 8   2 IR+, ⇡ 2 P}
and is called the set of useful vectors for ⌫. For a given pair (u, P ), let
V (X) = min
⇡2P
E⇡(u(X)) (2)
be the Gilboa-Schmeidler’s utility.
{W 2 Rk | V ( W )   0, 8   2 IR+} = {W 2 Rk | E⇡(u( W ))   0, 8   2 IR+,⇡ 2 P}
Hence it coincides with R. Furthermore given C 2 IRk a reference point, the
C-reference dependent ambiguity averse (RAA) utility, axiomatized by Mihm
[12] is defined by
VC(X) = min
⇡2P
[E⇡(u(X))  E⇡(u(C))] (3)
This is a concave variational utility, hence the set of useful vectors is indepen-
dent of X. As VC(C) = 0, RVC = {W 2 Rk | VC(C +  W )   0, 8   2 IR+}.
Equivalently
RVC = {W 2 Rk| E⇡(u(C +  W ))   E⇡(u(C)), 8   2 IR+,⇡ 2 P} = R
The previous discussion is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The set of useful vectors for a Bewley preference of type (1) coin-
cides with the set of useful vectors for a Gilboa-Schmeidler preference (2) or of
an RAA utility (3) for any reference point C 2 IRk.
Let us recall a characterization of useful vectors proven in Dana and Le Van
[4]. To this end, let
eP = ⇢p 2 4 | 9 ⇡ 2 P, Z 2 Rk s. t. ps = ⇡su0(zs)
E⇡(u0(Z))
, 8 s = 1, . . . , k
 
(4)
be the set of risk adjusted probabilities. We have (see Dana and Le Van [4]) :
Lemma 2 R = {W 2 Rk | Ep(W )   0, for all p 2 P˜}.
In the next two subsections, we introduce two concepts of absence of arbi-
trage, a concept of individual no-arbitrage and a concept of collective absence
arbitrage. These concepts only depend on agents’ useful vectors.
We first define the concept of no-arbitrage price (see Werner [17]).
5
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Definition 1 A price vector p 2 Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for agent i if
p ·W > 0, for all W 2 Ri\{0}. A price vector p 2 Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price”
for the economy if it is a no-arbitrage price for each agent.
Let Si denote the set of no-arbitrage prices for i. Using Lemma 2, Dana
and Le Van [4] characterize Si in terms of risk adjusted probabilities.
Lemma 3 1. The set of no-arbitrage prices for agent i is Si = cone int eP i
where p 2 int eP i if and only if 9 ⇡ 2 P i \ int 4, Z 2 Rk, 8s, a <
u0(zs) < b and ps = ⇡su
0(zs)
E⇡(u0(Z)) . The more risk averse, the more ambiguity
averse the agent, the larger is Si.
2. The set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy is \
i
Si = cone \
i
int eP i.
The more risk averse, the more ambiguity averse the agents, the larger is
the set of no-arbitrage prices for the economy.
2.2.2 Collective absence of arbitrage
From now on, a feasible trade is an m tuple W 1, . . . ,Wm with W i 2 Rk for
all i and
P
iW
i = 0. We recall the no-unbounded-arbitrage condition (NUBA)
introduced by Page [13] which requires inexistence of unbounded utility nonde-
creasing feasible trades.
Definition 2 The economy satisfies the NUBA condition if
P
iW
i = 0 and
W i 2 Ri for all i, implies W i = 0 for all i.
From Lemma 2, we may characterize the NUBA condition .
Corollary 1 NUBA is equivalent to: there exists no feasible tradeW 1, . . . ,Wm
with W i 6= 0 for some i that fulfills E⇡(W i)   0 for all i and ⇡ 2 eP i.
2.3 Existence of e cient allocations and equilibria
2.3.1 Concepts in equilibrium theory
We next recall standard concepts in equilibrium theory.
Given the allocation of initial endowments (Ei)mi=1, an allocation (X
i)mi=1 2
(Rk)m is attainable (or feasible) if
Pm
i=1X
i = E. The set of B-individually
rational attainable allocations A((Ei)mi=1) is defined by
A((Ei)mi=1) =
(
(Xi)mi=1 2 (Rk)m |
mX
i=1
Xi = E and Xi ⌫i Ei, 8 i
)
.
6
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Definition 3 Given (Ei)mi=1, an attainable allocation (X
i)mi=1 is B-e cient if
there does not exist (X 0i)mi=1 attainable such that X 0i ⌫i Xi for all i with a strict
inequality for some i. It is weakly B-e cient if there does not exist (X 0i)mi=1
attainable such that E⇡(ui(X 0i)) > E⇡(ui(Xi)), 8 ⇡ 2 P i, 8 i. It is individually
rational (weakly) B-e cient if it is (weakly) B-e cient and Xi ⌫i Ei for all i.
Since ui is strictly concave and strictly increasing and P i is compact for all i,
(X i)mi=1 is B-e cient if and only if (X
i)mi=1 is weakly B-e cient (see Lemma 4
and Remark 3 below).
Definition 4 A pair (X⇤, p⇤) 2 A((Ei)mi=1)⇥Rk\{0} is a (weak) B-equilibrium
with inertia if
1. for each agent i and X i 2 Rk, Xi  i Xi⇤ (E⇡(ui(Xi)) > E⇡(ui(Xi⇤)), 8 ⇡ 2
P i, 8 i) implies p⇤ ·Xi > p⇤ ·Xi⇤,
2. for each agent i, p⇤ ·Xi⇤ = p⇤ · Ei.
Since ui is strictly concave for all i, it may easily be verified that (X⇤, p⇤) is a
B-equilibrium with inertia if and only if it is a weak B-equilibrium with inertia.
Note that at an equilibrium with inertia, the allocation is individually rational.
2.3.2 Existence of e cient allocations and equilibria
The following theorem fully characterizes existence of individually rational B-
e cient allocations as well as B-equilibria with inertia.
Theorem 1 The following assertions are equivalent:
1. there exists a no-arbitrage price, equivalently \
i
int eP i 6= ;,
2. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm with W i 6= 0 for some i and
E⇡(W i)   0 for all ⇡ 2 eP i and for all i,
3. the set of B-individually rational attainable allocations is compact,
4. there exists a B-individually rational e cient allocation,
5. there exists a B-equilibrium with inertia.
Furthermore any equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
Proof : Since Xi ⌫i Ei is equivalent to VEi(X)   VEi(Ei) = 0, the set of
individually rational attainable allocations for the economy with Bewley’s pref-
erences coincides with the set of individually rational attainable allocations for
the economy with RAA utilities with reference points (Ei)mi=1. Applying Dana
7
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and Le Van [4] to these utilities, we obtain the equivalence between 1, 2 and 3.
Let us prove that 1 implies 4. Applying Dana and Le Van [4] to RAA util-
ities with reference points (Ei)mi=1, we obtain the existence of an individually
rational e cient allocation (X¯ 0i)mi=1 for RAA utilities. Let us show that it is B-
weakly e cient. Suppose not. Then there exists (X 0i)mi=1 attainable such that
E⇡(ui(X 0i)) > E⇡(ui(X¯i)) for all i and ⇡ 2 P i but then VEi(X 0i) > VEi(X¯i) for
all i contradicting the e ciency of (X¯ 0i)mi=1 for RAA utilities. Therefore (X¯ 0i)mi=1
is a B-individually rational weakly e cient allocation, hence a B-individually
rational e cient allocation.
Let us next show that 4 implies 2. Let (X¯i)mi=1 be a B-e cient allocation.
Suppose that there exists a feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm with W i 2 Ri for all i
and W i 6= 0 for some i. We then have E⇡(ui(X¯i + tW i))   E⇡(ui(X¯i)), for all
⇡ 2 P i for all i and as ui is strictly concave, E⇡(ui(X¯i + tW i)) > E⇡(ui(X¯i))
for all i such that W i 6= 0 and ⇡ 2 P i. The allocation (X¯i + tW i)i2I being
feasible, this contradicts the B-e ciency of (X¯i)mi=1. Hence 1-4 are equivalent.
Finally let us show that 1 is equivalent to 5. Let us first remark that if (X⇤, p⇤)
is an equilibrium with inertia, then p⇤ is a no arbitrage price. Indeed as ui
is strictly concave, if W i is useful and W i 6= 0, then E⇡(ui(X⇤i + tW i)) >
E⇡(ui(X⇤i)), 8 ⇡ 2 P i, hence p⇤ ·W i > 0. Hence if there exists an equilibrium,
there exists a no-arbitrage price and 5 implies 1. Conversely if 1 holds true,
then from Dana and Le Van [4], the economy with variational utilities (VEi)i2I
has an equilibrium (X⇤, p⇤). Let us show that (X⇤, p⇤) is a weak B-equilibrium
with inertia. Indeed if E⇡(ui(Xi)) > E⇡(ui(X⇤i)), 8 ⇡ 2 P i, then VEi(X) >
VEi(X
⇤i), hence p⇤ · X i > p⇤ · X⇤i. Furthermore as the family of utilities
(VEi)i2I is strictly concave, if X⇤i 6= Ei, then VEi(X⇤i) > VEi(Ei), hence
X⇤i  i Ei proving that (X⇤, p⇤) is a weak Bewley equilibrium with inertia,
hence a Bewley equilibrium with inertia.
Remark 1 When stating theorem 1, we have assumed that all agents had Be-
wley’s incomplete preferences. From Dana and Le Van [4], we could have as-
sumed that all agents had Gilboa-Schmeidler’s utilities. A more general result
is true : agent i may either have a Bewley’s incomplete preference or a Gilboa-
Schmeidler’s utility or an RAA utility with any reference point with utility index
ui and sets of priors P i or any utility with useful vectors Ri. Indeed if agent i
has a Bewley’s incomplete preference, one can consider the fictitious agent with
an RAA utility with reference point Ei, utility index ui and priors P i. From
Dana and Le Van [4], we obtain the existence of an equilibrium for the ficti-
8
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tious economy. As in the proof of 1 implies 4, any equilibrium of the fictitious
economy is an equilibrium of the original economy.
Remark 2 The strict concavity of the utility functions plays an important
and subtle role. First, for most purposes, when X   Y , we may assume
that E⇡(u(X)) > E⇡(u(Y )), 8 ⇡ 2 P. Second, strict concavity is used to
prove the equivalence between weak B-equilibrium and B-equilibrium and weak
B-e ciency and B-e ciency. Third, as u is strictly concave, for any useful
vector W 6= 0 and any ⇡ 2 P , the map t ! E⇡(u(X + tW )) is strictly in-
creasing. In theorem 1, this is used in 4 implies 2 and in the assertion that an
equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
Remark 3 In our model an e cient allocation exists i↵ \
i
int eP i 6= ; while
a given attainable allocation (Xi)mi=1 is e cient i↵ the sets of risk-adjusted
probabilities eP i(Xi) at Xi, i = 1, . . . ,m intersect (see Rigotti and Shannon
[15]).
3 An abstract economy with incomplete preferences
3.1 The economy
Many agents in financial markets are not single individuals but groups of indi-
viduals. We learn from social choice that it is not possible to assign a complete
preference satisfying reasonable assumptions to a group of individuals. A nat-
ural way to resolve this paradox is to allow for the possibility of incomplete
preferences. In this section, we assume that each agent has a set of utilities,
one for each member of the group. Two goods may be compared by the agent
only if there is unanimity in the group on the choice.
More precisely, we consider an economy withm agents and d goods. Agent i
has consumption space IRd, endowment Ei 2 IRd and incomplete (or complete)
convex preferences over IRd, defined by a family U i : IRd ! IR of concave utility
functions : X i 2 IRd is preferred to Y i 2 IRd by agent i, denoted Xi ⌫i Y i if
ui(Xi)   ui(Y i) for every ui 2 U i. The associated strict preference is X  i Y
if X ⌫i Y and ui(X) > ui(Y ) for some ui 2 U i. Let E = Pmi=1Ei be the
aggregate endowment.
We assume that for every i, the utilities in U i are everywhere finite, con-
cave, and there is a topology on U i which makes it compact and such that the
evaluation map u 2 U i 7! u(X) is continuous for every X 2 IRd. We assume
that u(0) = 0 for all u 2 U i and all i. Let us give two examples of such families.
9
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For notational simplicity, we drop the subscript i.
Example 1
Let T be a compact subset of IRp which can be interpreted as a subset of pa-
rameters and U = {u : IRd ⇥ IRp ! IR}, u continuous on IRd ⇥ T and u(., t)
concave for every t 2 T .
Example 2
U is a set of concave functions IRd ! IR, closed for the topology of uniform
convergence on compact subsets and uniformly bounded on each ball of IRd. U
is then kR Lipschitz on the ball of radius R for some constant kR which depends
on the radius. From Ascoli’s theorem, U is then compact for the topology of
uniform convergence on comp2act subsets.
An allocation (X i)i2I 2 IRdm is feasible if
P
iX
i = E. The set of individu-
ally rational attainable allocations A((Ei)mi=1) is defined as in 2.3
3.2 Arbitrage concepts
We briefly redefine for abstract incomplete preferences, the concepts which were
defined in section 2.2. Let
cP i(X) = {Y 2 Rk | u(Y )   u(X), 8 u 2 U i} = \u2U i{Y 2 Rk | u(Y )   u(X)}
be the preferred set at X by i and Ri(X) be its asymptotic cone. As the utilities
u 2 U i are concave, Ri(X)
is independent of X and denoted Ri. It is called the set of useful vectors
for ⌫i. From Rockafellar’s [16] corollary 8.3.3,
Ri = {W 2 IRd | u( W )   0, 8   2 IR+, u 2 U i }.
As discussed in the previous section, for any C 2 IRd, Ri is also the set of
useful vectors for any complete preference represented by a utility of the form
VEi(X) = minu2U i [u(X)   u(Ei)]. Note that this utility is well defined under
our assumptions.
A price vector p 2 Rd is a ” no-arbitrage price” for agent i if p ·W > 0,
for all W 2 Ri\{0}. Let Si denote the set of no-arbitrage prices for i. Then
Si =  int(Ri)0 (where (Ri)0 = {p 2 Rd | p · X  0, for all X 2 Ri}). A
price vector p 2 Rk is a ” no-arbitrage price” for the economy if it is a no-
arbitrage price for each agent. A price vector p 2 Rk is a no-arbitrage price for
the economy if and only if p 2 \iSi =  \iint(Ri)0.
10
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An m tuple (W 1, . . . ,Wm) 2 Rdm is a feasible trade if PiW i = 0.
A tradeW 2 Rd\{0} is a half-line for a utility u : Rd ! R if there exists X 2 Rd
such that u(X +  W ) = u(X) for all     0. As u is concave, when it has no
half-line, then u(X +  W ) > u(X) for every X 2 Rd and   > 0 and W 6= 0.
3.3 E ciency and equilibrium concepts
Definition 5 1. A feasible allocation (Xi)mi=1 is e cient if there does not
exist (X 0i)mi=1 feasible such that X 0i ⌫i Xi for all i with a strict inequality
for some i. It is weakly e cient if there does not exist (X 0i)mi=1 feasible
such that ui(X 0i) > ui(Xi), 8 ui 2 U i, 8 i. It is individually rational
(weakly) e cient if it is (weakly) e cient and X i ⌫i Ei for all i.
2. A pair (X⇤, p⇤) 2 A((Ei)mi=1) ⇥ IRd\{0} is an (weak) equilibrium with
inertia if
(a) for any i and X i 2 IRd, X i  i X⇤i (ui(Xi) > ui(X⇤i) for every
ui 2 U i) implies p⇤ ·Xi > p⇤ ·X⇤i,
(b) for any i, p⇤ ·X⇤i = p⇤ · Ei.
A common increasing direction is a trade e 2 IRd such that e · p > 0 for every
(X,u) 2 IRd ⇥ U i, p 2 @u(X) and every i. When e is a common increasing
direction, u(X te) < u(X), u(X+te) > u(X) for every t   0, X 2 IRd, u 2 U i
and i.
Lemma 4 Let u be strictly concave for every u 2 U i and i.
1. A pair (X⇤, p⇤) 2 A((Ei)mi=1) ⇥ IRd\{0} is an equilibrium with inertia if
and only if it is a weak equilibrium with inertia
2. If agents have a common increasing direction, then an attainable alloca-
tion (X i)mi=1 is e cient if and only if it is weakly e cient.
Proof : The proof of the first assertion is omitted. To prove the second, clearly,
if (Xi)mi=1 is e cient, it is weakly e cient. Let us show that weak e ciency
implies e ciency. Assume that (Xi)mi=1 is a weakly e cient allocation and that
it is not e cient. W.l.o.g. assume that there exists a feasible allocation (Y i)mi=1
such that Y 1  1 X1 and Y i ⌫i Xi, i 6= 1. By considering (Y 1+X1)2 instead of
Y 1, we may assume that u(Y 1) > u(X1), 8 u 2 U1. For a given " > 0, let
V" =
 
u 2 U1 | u(Y 1   e") > u(X1) 
V" is open, since the evaluation maps are continuous. Let us show that ["V" =
U1. Let u 2 U1. Since u is continuous, there exists "u such that u(Y 1   e") >
11
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u(X1) for every "  "u. Hence ["V" = U1. As U1 is compact, there exists a
finite subcovering of U1 by (V"i). Let " = mini "i and "0 = "m 1 . We then have
Y 1   e"  1 X1 and Y i + e"0  i Xi, i 6= 1
contradicting the weak e ciency of X.
Remark 4 It is easy to verify that if (X⇤, p⇤) is a weak equilibrium with iner-
tia, then X⇤ is weakly e cient and that, if agents have a common increasing
direction and (X⇤, p⇤) is an equilibrium with inertia, then X⇤ is e cient. In
other words, the first welfare theorem holds true and is straightforward. Carlier
and Dana [3] provide general conditions on the families of utilities under which
a weakly e cient allocation is a weak equilibrium with transfer. Hence a weak
form of the second welfare theorem holds true. Under these conditions, when
the utilities are strictly concave and have a common increasing direction (as it
is the case in the Bewley model of section 2), weak equilibria with inertia co-
incide with equilibria with inertia, weakly e cient allocations are e cient and
any e cient allocation is an equilibrium with transfer.
3.4 Existence results
Proposition 1 The following assertions are equivalent:
1. there exists a no-arbitrage price for the economy (\
i
int (Ri)0 6= ;),
2. NUBA:
P
iW
i = 0 and W i 2 Ri for all i implies W i = 0 for all i,
3. the set of individually rational attainable allocations is compact.
Proof : As the set of useful vectors of ⌫i and VEi coincide and the set of
individually rational attainable allocations for the economy with utilities (VEi)i
coincides with the set of individually rational attainable allocations for the
economy with preferences (⌫i)i2I , the equivalence between 1, 2 and 3 follows
from standard results on arbitrage with complete preferences.
Theorem 2 Let any assertion of Proposition 1 hold true.Then
1. there exists an individually rational weakly e cient allocation,
2. there exists a weak equilibrium with inertia.
Proof : It is also standard that any assertion of Proposition 1 implies the exis-
tence of an individually rational e cient allocation (X¯ i)mi=1 or of an equilibrium
12
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(X⇤, p⇤) for the economy with utilities (VEi)i. By the same proofs as in theorem
1, (X¯i)mi=1 is an individually rational weakly e cient allocation for the economy
with preferences (⌫i)i and (X⇤, p⇤) is a weak equilibrium with inertia.
Theorem 3 1. If u has no half-line for every u 2 U i and i, then the as-
sertions of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 are equivalent and any weak
equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price.
2. If u is strictly concave for every u 2 U i and i, then
(a) the assertions of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 are equivalent to the
existence of an equilibrium
(b) If furthermore, agents have a common increasing direction, then the
assertions of Proposition 1 and of Theorem 2 are equivalent to the
existence of an individually rational e cient allocation.
Proof : Let us first remark that if u has no half-line for every u 2 U i and i, any
weak equilibrium price is a no-arbitrage price. Indeed let (X⇤, p⇤) be a weak
equilibrium with inertia. Then for any useful vector W i 6= 0, u(X⇤i + tW i) >
u(X⇤i), 8 u 2 U i, for any t > 0. Hence p⇤ ·W i > 0 which proves that p⇤ is a
no-arbitrage price for the economy. This shows that assertion 2 of Theorem 2
implies assertion 1 of Proposition 1.
As mentioned in remark 4, it is easy to verify that a weak equilibrium with
inertia is weakly e cient. Hence assertion 2 of Theorem 2 implies assertion 1
of 2. To complete the proof that the assertions of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2
are equivalent, let us show that assertion 1 of Theorem 2 implies assertion 2 of
Proposition 1. Let (X¯ i)mi=1 be an individually rational weakly e cient alloca-
tion and suppose that there exists a feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wm with W i 2 Ri
for all i andW i 6= 0 for some i. We have u(X¯ i+tW i)   u(X¯i), 8 u 2 U i, for all
i, and u(X¯ i + tW i) > u(X¯i), 8u 2 U i, for any i such that W i 6= 0. The alloca-
tion (X¯ i+tW i)i2I being feasible, this contradicts the weak e ciency of (X¯i)mi=1.
Finally, if u is strictly concave, then u has no half-line, hence the assertions of
Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 are equivalent. From lemma 4, any weak equilib-
rium with inertia is an equilibrium with inertia. If furthermore, agents have a
common increasing direction, from lemma 4, any weakly e cient allocation is
e cient .
13
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